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Wi-Fi is by far the most popular wireless technology in homes and offices around the world. Behind this success lays a great user experience; any Wi-Fi device can be connected to a secure Wi-Fi network in a mather of minutes, and from then on connection is automatic and secure.
Anyfi.net is a carrier Wi-Fi platform that makes it possible to provide that same user experience on the go. You can think of it as a novel approach to authentication, one that doesn't change how devices are authenticated but where; instead of authenticating a device in the local access point the raw encrypted Wi-Fi traffic is tunneled over the Internet to a location where it can be seamlessly authenticated using credentials that are already in the device, e.g. the home Wi-Fi passphrase, a TLS certificate or even a SIM card.
This architecture ensures a perfect user experience: there is no registration process, no software to install on the device, not even any settings to change; devices just connect, automatically and securely. But as the service provider you can still communicate with your subscribers through a captive portal web interface, you're just no-longer trying your customers' patience with a cumbersome registration and sign-in process. Instead you can focus 100% on your commercial message.
As great as Anyfi.net is it wouldn't be of much use if it was only available in equipment from a single vendor. Instead we've packaged it as an open technology, with a software implementation available to all vendors under a no-charge royalty-free license. Wi-Fi equipment with Anyfi.net pre-integrated is available off-the-shelf and if your favorite vendor is not listed yet just ask them to integrate the software. In most cases it takes less than a man-week.
Anyfi.net software works out of the box and non-commercial use is free. For commercial use you need to register an account and pay a usage-based monthly fee. If all this just sounds daunting then your should consider managed solution from Anyfi Networks. We'll help you integrate the software in your deployed equipment, interface with the platform and roll out your carrier Wi-Fi service.
Throughout this documentation we use a number of technical terms that may need a short introduction. To the largest extent possible we try to use the standard IEEE 802.11 terms and definitions.
Anyfi.net technology lets you leverage existing infrastructure, e.g. residential gateways, to create mobile Wi-Fi services. But existing infrastructure is there for a reason — it has a primary function. For example a residential gateway has been designed to provide Internet access to a fixed-line subscriber in their home. We call this the primary function of the residential gateway.
Safeguarding the primary function of an access point is our first priority. The strong security model and advanced spectrum aware prioritization are designed to protect it at all cost.
Public access point is our term for an IEEE 802.11 access point with the primary function of providing wireless Internet access in a public space.
Public access points are often owned and managed by a service provider, e.g. a fixed-broadband or mobile operator, but are sometimes operated by a venue or roaming aggregator directly.
Corporate access point is our term for an IEEE 802.11 access point with the primary function of providing wireless access to a corporate LAN.
Corporate access points are often, as the term implies, owned and managed by a corporation.
A residential gateway is for the purpose of this document an operator managed broadband gateway with an integrated IEEE 802.11 access point. Its primary function is to provide Internet access to a fixed-line broadband subscriber in their home.
In some contexts this term may be interpreted to also refer to similar equipment used to provide Internet access to a small business.
A consumer Wi-Fi router is very similar to a residential gateway, except that it is not managed by the operator. The firmware in a consumer Wi-Fi router can only be updated by the consumer that owns it, or in some cases by the vendor.
A tunnel termination gateway (TTG) is a network element installed in an operator's edge or core network for the purpose of providing remote secure access to the services of the operator, e.g. Internet access or other more valuable services. In the most common case a TTG is implemented in software running on blade hardware conforming to a standard form factor, e.g. AdvancedTCA, but it can also be implemented using special purpose hardware or even as a so-called virtual appliance, e.g. a VMware image.
Basic Service Set (BSS) is the IEEE 802.11 term for a wireless access point. Modern access points however often implement a Multi BSS (MBSS) feature allowing a single physical access point to imitate multiple access points. In IEEE 802.11 terminology such an access point supports multiple Basic Service Sets.
A BSS is identified by a BSSID, which is represented as a MAC address.
Extended Service Set is the IEEE 802.11 term for a Local Area Network (LAN) segment with Layer 2 connectivity. A number of wireless access points may provide wireless access to such a network. In IEEE 802.11 terminology we would say that the ESS consists of one or several Basic Service Sets. An ESS is identified by an ESSID, which is a 32 character string also known as an SSID. Note though that while SSIDs should be locally unique they cannot be relied on as a globally unique identifier; there can be networks with the same SSID elsewhere in the world.
Wireless Termination Point (WTP) is used in this document to refer to an IEEE 802.11 access point providing radio access services to a mobile device. What distinguishes a WTP from an access point is that a WTP does not terminate the IEEE 802.11 protocol itself. It simply acts as a relay for raw IEEE 802.11 frames, receiving them through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel and sending them out on the local radio — and wise-versa in the opposite direction.
There is a one-to-one relationship between WTPs and radio front-ends. The difference is that WTP is used to refer to the physical device whereas radio front-end refers to the abstract architectural element.
The Primary BSS of an access point is a Basic Service Set that is used for the primary function of the access point. A residential gateway typically only has one such BSS, the subscriber’s home Wi-Fi network, but may be configured with several. A corporate access point most often has several primary BSSes.
A Virtual BSS is a Basic Service Set that provides access to a remote logical Wi-Fi network, through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel. The Anyfi.net radio front-end software is responsible for allocating Virtual BSSes to provide mobile devices in the vicinity with remote access to their preferred Wi-Fi networks.
A WTP can have several simultaneously active Virtual BSSes, each terminated in a separate TTP.
Analogous to the term WTP we refer to the physical equipment where the Wi-Fi over IP is terminated as the Tunnel Termination Point (TTP).
In this case as well there is a one-to-one relationship between TTPs and tunnel termination back-ends. The difference is that TTP is used to refer to the physical device whereas tunnel termination back-end refers to the abstract architectural element.
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) is an attack against a cryptographic system where the attacker inserts himself as a middle-man in the communication between two parties, with the ability to eavesdrop on and modify the communication [1].
A rogue access point is a wireless access point that has either been installed on a secure company network without explicit authorization from a local network administrator, or has been created to allow an attacker to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack by mimicking a real access point and tricking a device into connecting [2].
Anyfi.net technology can be used to realize many use-cases, but the most interesting have a core user experience in common: there is no software to install on the device, no registration process, and no usernames or passwords to remember or enter. We call this ZERO sign-on because there is absolutely nothing the subscriber needs to do to connect, not even the first time. And once connected they can feel safe because their communication is protected by the standard WPA/WPA2 security mechanism end-to-end, all the way from the device to a secure location. Advanced spectrum aware traffic prioritization safeguards the quality of experience for all parties.
Single sign-on is commonly used to refer to an authentication process where the end-user installs some software on their mobile device so that they only have to provide their authentication credentials once, e.g. the first time they connect. Anyfi.net technology makes it possible to create ZERO sign-on services, i.e. services that require no special software on the device, or manual registration process, but still provides "no touch" authentication even the first time a user connects.
With Anyfi.net technology there is no additional software that needs to be installed on the device. From the device's point of view it's all standard Wi-Fi.
With many hotspot solutions the end-user is often required to register an account on a website before they can access the wireless network. With Anyfi.net technology this manual registration step can often be avoided since pre-existing credentials are used for subscriber identification and authentication.
By tunneling the Wi-Fi over IP to where the mobile device can be authenticated, e.g. using the SIM card or the home WPA passphrase, it is possible to implement "no touch" authentication that works even on the first connection attempt.
The WPA/WPA2 security protocol are commonly used to secure the air interface of Wi-Fi systems. With Anyfi.net this protocol is extended over the backhaul as well and terminated in a tunnel termination back-end. This leads to a greatly simplified security model with strong and verifiable guarantees for user plane data integrity and privacy.
An access point with Anyfi.net support often has another primary function: it may e.g. serve as the residential gateway for a fixed-line broadband subscriber. Anyfi.net software carefully measures and throttles mobile devices to ensure that traffic on a Primary BSS is always prioritized and that the fixed-line subscriber's user experience is not in any way impacted. Both backhaul bandwidth and radio spectrum are taken into account.
Security is important in all Wi-Fi networks but requirements vary depending on how the technology is deployed. We make a clear distinction between the following three security requirements.
Access must be restricted so that only authorized users can access the network and its resources.
Once a device is connected to the network it must not be possible for a third party to eavesdrop on the communication between the device and the network.
Once a device is connected to the network it must not be possible for a third party to modify the communication between the device and the network.
In residential or enterprise Wi-Fi networks preventing unauthorized access is usually the focus of attention. Potential threats to data privacy and data integrity on the air interface are handled with WPA/WPA2 mutual authentication and encryption, but not so on the wireline side. It is assumed that anybody with physical access to network elements is prevented through other means (e.g. physical security, company policy, legal agreements and so on) from eavesdropping on or modifying the communication of other users.
In an enterprise or residential context this key assumption often holds true, but not so in a carrier context. Access points and backhaul connections are more often than not under the physical control of somebody that cannot effectively be prevented from attempting to eavesdrop on or modify the communication of others. Making this incorrect assumption and deploying equipment designed for enterprise use in a carrier context can lead to severe security problems.
Some vendors in the carrier Wi-Fi space try to mitigate these problems by separately encrypting backhaul connections with IPSec or similar VPN protocols. This however leaves a weak link: clear-text data can still be accessed and modified within the access point itself. There are examples of this weak link being successfully exploited in the field [3].
Anyfi.net technology in contrast has been designed from the ground up for carrier-grade security. User plane data privacy and data integrity is ensured, even when an attacker is in physical control of both the visited access point and the backhaul connection.
Most WPA/WPA2 security mechanisms ensure strong mutual authentication, i.e. the device is authenticated to the network but the network is also authenticated to the device. This acts as a safeguard against man-in-the-middle attacks in the form of so-called rogue access points.
No chain is however stronger than it's weakest link; the authentication mechanism can only ensure that the counterparties have access to the authentication credentials they say they do. Therefore, if the surrounding system exposes the credentials to unauthorized third parties then the authentication is essentially null and void. In a WPA/WPA2 Personal context this means that the passphrase must be protected. In a WPA/WPA2 Enterprise context it means ensuring that no untrusted entity has access to the RADIUS interface.
Anyfi.net software goes to great lengths to protect authentication credentials: in the case of WPA/WPA2 Personal the passphrase never leaves the residential gateway or consumer Wi-Fi router and in the case of WPA/WPA2 Enterprise the RADIUS interface only needs to be accessible from the tunnel termination gateway (TTG) which can be physically secured.
In most Wi-Fi systems designed for residential or enterprise use user data is only encrypted over the air, or if it is encrypted over the backhaul connection then the backhaul is protected by a separate encryption tunnel, e.g. IPSec or other VPN. Anyfi.net technology in contrast encrypts the connection end-to-end, all the way from the mobile device to the tunnel termination point (TTP), using the standard IEEE 802.11i AES or TKIP encryption. The encryption keys are derived in the mobile device and at the tunnel termination point (TTP) and are as a rule only available there.
But every rule has an exception. In order to optimize network traffic flow it is possible to adapt Anyfi.net software to send the Temporal Key (TK) into the operators network so that Internet-bound traffic can be broken out centrally. The standard software available under the standard license will however never expose encryption keys to the outside world. We only make software with this adaptation available for deployment in systems where a trust relationship between the end-subscriber and the operator is already established. For example, if the operator has the capability to remotely update the firmware in the subscriber's home gateway then the subscriber has placed his or her trust in the operator and the privacy and integrity of their communication is protected through other means than purely technical. In this context the Temporal Key (TK) can be transferred from the residential gateway to the operator's network without affecting the nature of the trust relationship between subscriber and operator. On the other hand, the same subscriber can reasonably expect the integrity of their network to be protected even from their operator if they are using a consumer Wi-Fi router. In this case a transfer of the Temporal Key (TK) is not acceptable.
Anyfi.net is not an authentication technology, it is a tunneling technology that simply brings raw Wi-Fi radio traffic to where it can be authenticated and decrypted. The security of Anyfi.net technology rests firmly on the tested and proven WPA/WPA2 mechanisms. There are however some aspects that need careful consideration when employing these mechanisms in a different context.
The Internet is much larger than the coverage area of your average Wi-Fi network. Since we expose the IEEE 802.11 stack in the tunnel termination back-end to frames coming in over the network a security defect in this software is much more likely to be exploited and the potential consequences much more severe. We have therefore implemented some security measures intended to harden the IEEE 802.11 subsystem against such attacks.
Firstly, the tunnel termination back-end software will not provide remote access to networks protected with WEP. We have also implemented protection against brute force attacks. The tunnel termination back-end will not allow a mobile device to authenticate until it has received an introduction message from the cloud-based matchmaking service. This prevents parallel "port scanning" type attacks. Once the introduction message is received the back-end will only allow the mobile device a certain number of WPA/WPA2 authentication attempts before disconnecting. The back-end also reports such authentication failures to the matchmaking service which can prevent the attacker from connecting to other tunnel termination back-ends.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are much easier to exploit in a Wi-Fi over IP context than in a regular Wi-Fi context since IP packets, in contract to radio frames, can be intercepted and prevented from reaching their intended recipient. There are however few known attacks against WPA or WPA2 that could be facilitated by this. The only one we are aware of at this time is Toshihiro Ohigashi and Masakatu Morii [4] and we do not consider that a significant threat in practice.
Most jurisdictions have regulations mandating telecommunications providers to assist law enforcement in subscriber identification and lawful intercept. In the United States this is regulated in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994. In the European Union the European Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (Official Journal C 329) mandates similar measures.
Anyfi.net technology aligns well with such legislation because a radio front-end never terminates traffic locally in the WTP but instead sends it through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel to a tunnel termination back-end where traceability and lawful intercept capabilities are already in place. This architecture also effectively prevents cases of mistaken identity [5] or liability for third party copyright infringement [6].
In some jurisdictions it is necessary to store the physical location of the subscriber throughout the session. Anyfi.net technology has been designed to meet this requirement.
Anyfi.net is a Wi-Fi virtualization technology that partitions the IEEE 802.11 stack into three parts: a radio front-end that handles the low level real-time aspects of the protocol, a tunnel termination back-end that implements the higher layers of the stack and a cloud-based matchmaking service that connects front-ends and back-ends on demand. This architecture makes it possible to dynamically assemble complete Wi-Fi stacks which provide exactly the network each mobile device is looking for on demand.
A control panel or RESTful web service interface allows operators, hardware vendors and other stakeholders to control which front-ends and back-ends are connected and what happens after a device connects.
A radio front-end has two main responsibilities: constantly monitoring the radio environment to detect when a mobile device comes within range and, when so instructed by the cloud-based matchmaking service, serving as a Wireless Termination Point (WTP) for its preferred networks.
The radio front-end handles the low level real-time critical aspects of the IEEE 802.11 protocol, e.g. sending acknowledgement frames and transmitting periodic beacons. The higher level MLME and data frames are instead encapsulated in UDP/IP datagrams and forwarded to the relevant tunnel termination back-end. In this sense the front-end functions as a "dumb" radio; it simply forwards (often encrypted) IEEE 802.11 radio frames between its wired network interface and the Wi-Fi radio.
Adding radio front-end functionality to a public access point or residential gateway is a simple matter of a remote firmware update. The radio front-end software can of course also be factory installed e.g. in consumer Wi-Fi routers.
A tunnel termination back-end functions almost exactly like a Wi-Fi access point, with one important difference: instead of sending and receiving IEEE 802.11 frames over a local radio it sends and receives them on its wired network interface, encapsulated in UDP/IP datagrams.
The back-end performs all the higher level functions of the IEEE 802.11 stack including authentication and encryption. This architecture is essential for ensuring the Anyfi.net security model. The back-end is also responsible for implementing the API mechanisms necessary for more advanced mobile Wi-Fi services.
Anyfi.net tunnel termination software can be deployed in residential gateways as a remote firmware update or pre-installed in consumer Wi-Fi routers. Once there it will allow mobile devices to connect to the local Wi-Fi network remotely, through any radio front-end. The software can also be integrated in special purpose tunnel termination gateways.
The cloud-based matchmaking service coordinates radio front-ends and tunnel termination back-ends and connects them to form complete IEEE 802.11 stacks on demand. It communicates with front-ends and back-ends with a lightweight UDP/IP based protocol in many ways similar to DNS.
Which radio front-end is connected to which tunnel termination back-end is governed by Bindings. Bindings can be created and manipulated through the control panel or the RESTful web service.
The matchmaking service also collects accounting information, from both radio front-ends and tunnel termination back-ends. This information is made available to the service provider through the RESTful web service in the form of Accounting Records.
The matchmaking servers are operated by Anyfi Networks and delivered as a cloud-based service, making the Anyfi.net carrier Wi-Fi platform available under a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) model.
Let's go through a complete use-case and have a look at how the parts fit together.
For the purposes of this walkthrough imagine you are a fixed-line broadband subscriber and your ISP has provided you with a Wi-Fi equipped residential gateway containing Anyfi.net software.
When your residential gateway starts up the embedded tunnel termination back-end software will send a registration message to the cloud-based matchmaking service containing a UUID identifying your home Wi-Fi network and a template that can be used to generate an IEEE 802.11 beacon frame for this network. If this is the first time the matchmaking service receives a registration message from your gateway it will create a Service instance to represent your network. It will also store the beacon template and make note of the source IP address and UDP port number of the registration message.
When you connect a new device to your home Wi-Fi network for the first time the tunnel termination back-end software will send another message to the cloud-based matchmaking service, this time containing the MAC address of your device and the UUID identifying your home Wi-Fi network. The matchmaking service uses this information to create a new Client representing your device and a Binding encoding your device's preference for your home Wi-Fi network.
Now whenever you come close to a radio front-end, be it a public access point, residential gateway or consumer Wi-Fi router, your device will automatically connect to your home Wi-Fi exactly as if you were at home. To accomplish this feat the radio front-end must connect to the tunnel termination back-end in your home gateway to form a complete IEEE 802.11 stack, and the resulting Wi-Fi network must from your device's point of view be indistinguishable from your regular home Wi-Fi. Magical as it may sound it's really quite simple, and so quick that the device doesn't even notice.
The control plane connects radio front-ends and tunnel termination back-ends to the cloud-based matchmaking service through a light-weight UDP/IP protocol, in many ways similar to DNS. It is used to coordinate front-ends and back-ends to form complete Wi-Fi stacks on demand. We here detail some of the features of the control plane protocol.
The control plane provides a mechanism for fine-grained control of network visibility. Visibility decisions can be made both on a per mobile device and per radio front-end basis, by simply choosing when to present a network to a mobile device.
A decision to present a network is encoded by the matchmaking service as a network visibility policy and sent to the radio front-end in a UDP packet. The front-end then matches the estimated properties of a hypothetical future connection against the policy to decide if to allocate a virtual BSS on the Wireless Termination Point or not. The network visibility policy can e.g. contain a minimum signal level threshold and thresholds for the estimated upstream and downstream capacities of a connection (taking both spare backhaul and radio spectrum into account).
Some examples of functionality that can be accomplished by selectively presenting networks are provided below.
It is possible to configure a minimum radio link quality that must be attained before a network is presented to the mobile device. This avoids the common problem of mobile devices with alternate access methods switching over to a low quality Wi-Fi network.
It is also possible to consider the Wireless Termination Point's available spare capacity, radio spectrum and backhaul, and only making the mobile devices preferred network available if these spare resources are adequate for a high quality user experience.
There are cases when a device may roam onto a neighbouring Wireless Termination Point (WTP) even though there is a direct radio link between the device and the Tunnel Termination Point (TTP). Anyfi.net tunnel termination back-end software implements some functionality to avoid this; specifically refusing to communicate with a mobile device through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel if the same device can be heard on the local radio.
Wi-Fi is perfect for so-called nomadic use-cases, but less well adapted for truly mobile use-cases such as when the user is traveling in a car. The cloud-based matchmaking service can in these cases instruct the radio front-end to delay the presentation of highly mobile devices' preferred networks, in effect limiting service to stationary or nomadic use-cases.
Band steering increases overall throughput by steering capable client devices from the 2.4 GHz band to the less crowded 5.8 GHz band. The cloud-based matchmaking service can trivially accomplish this by instructing radio front-ends operating in the 2.4 GHz band to delay the presentation of the network when the request is coming from a 5.8 GHz capable device and there is a 5.8 GHz radio front-end within range.
Many Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are terminated in a single location, e.g. a mobile network core, it is not uncommon that the back-end infrastructure, e.g. tunnel termination gateways, IEEE 802.1X authenticators and AAA-servers, is overloaded. In a legacy Wi-Fi environment this may lead to long authentication delays and similar problems. With Anyfi.net technology it is possible to instead gradually increase minimum radio link quality requirements until the back-end infrastructure is able to cope. This ensures the best use of network assets and maximizes quality of experience.
The tunnel termination back-end may also update the visibility policy employed by a radio front-end to which it is directly connected. This is useful when suppressing remote connections if the device is in close proximity to the home Wi-Fi network.
The Anyfi.net technology and protocols have been carefully designed to only allocate resources when they are actually needed. The radio front-end will only allocate a new Virtual BSS if there is a device that needs to be served through an already allocated Virtual BSS. It will then set up a beacon and answer probe requests based on the beacon template provided by the matchmaking service.
At this point the Wi-Fi over IP tunnel to the tunnel termination back-end is not yet established — tunnel setup is deferred until the device attempts to associate with the Wi-Fi network. Resource deallocation follows a similar early release scheme.
This just-in-time resource allocation scheme ensures that tunnel termination back-end load scales with the number of mobile devices served, and not with the number of radio front-ends in the network.
Tunnel termination back-ends periodically send a load indication message to the cloud-based matchmaking service. This load indication can be used to limit the rate of new tunnels to the back-end. When the tunnel termination resources of a virtual Wi-Fi network become overloaded the matchmaking service will prioritize tunnels originating from access points with a high quality radio link to the mobile device, thereby ensuring that available resources are used to maximum possible benefit.
Several tunnel termination back-ends may also be configured with identical Service UUID and Wi-Fi network properties. In this case the matchmaking service will automatically distribute Wi-Fi over IP connections across available back-ends. This mechanism can be used to load balance across several tunnel termination gateways.
If multiple tunnel termination back-ends are used to terminate the same Wi-Fi network this will also provide redundancy and automatic failover. Should tunnel termination gateway suffer a failure, the radio front-ends connected to it will close the connection and deallocate their corresponding virtual BSSes. When a mobile device reassociates to the network the matchmaking service will introduce the radio front-end to a tunnel termination back-end running on another tunnel termination gateway. The end result is a glitch in connectivity that lasts less than a minute and it only affects the STAs that were served by the failing tunnel termination gateway.
The user data plane connects a radio front-end to a tunnel termination back-end through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel.
Wi-Fi over IP in this case is not marketing speak — it clearly describes the concrete implementation: IEEE 802.11 frames coming in on the radio are encapsulated in a thin UDP/IP header and sent out over the backhaul. In the opposite direction UDP/IP packets coming in over the backhaul connection carry IEEE 802.11 frames ready to be sent out over the radio.
When the tunnel termination software runs on a residential gateway or consumer Wi-Fi router the standard WPA/WPA2 4-way handshake goes all the way from the mobile device to the user's home, where the device is authenticated using the passphrase stored in the tunnel termination point (TTP). Since this passphrase was entered into the device (or transfered to the device using Wi-Fi Protected Setup) when it was first connected to the Wi-Fi network no user interaction is necessary for authentication, not even the first time a device connects through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel, ensuring what we refer to as ZERO sign-on. Also, since the passphrase is only available in the mobile device and at the tunnel termination point (TTP) the mutual authentication property of the WPA-PSK security mechanism ensures that the end-user is in fact connected to their own network, and not to a rogue access point.
When the tunnel termination software runs on a tunnel termination gateway the standard WPA/WPA2 4-way handshake goes all the way from the mobile device to the tunnel termination gateway where the IEEE 802.1X authenticator can verify the identity of the subscriber using an EAP based security mechanism. This mechanism can be EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, EAP-AKA' or any other mechanism supported by the AAA-server. Note that with this architecture the RADIUS interface is only used to connect the tunnel termination gateway to the AAA-server within a trusted network environment. This combined with the mutual authentication property of the security mechanism ensures that the end-user is in fact connected to their operator's network, and not to a rogue access point.
Since the 4-way handshake runs all the way from the mobile device to the tunnel termination back-end the encryption keys are also derived only in these two places. This architecture ensures user data integrity and data confidentiality end-to-end, all the way from the mobile device to the tunnel termination back-end. This is key to the Anyfi.net security model.
It may seem that a simple fixed bandwidth limit for mobile devices would be sufficient but this is unfortunately not the case. The average radio link quality for mobile devices tend to be quite low and large amounts of spectrum are therefore consumed even at modest throughput. Unless radio resources are carefully managed a mobile device can severely impact the user experience of a residential subscriber even at low data rates.
For example, it would not be uncommon for a mobile device to have such a low quality radio link that its maximum unthrottled throughput would be just 1 Mbps, or even less. A primary user of the WTP that normally enjoys throughput of up to 50 Mbps would then be severely impacted even if mobile bandwidth use is quite low. The table below provides some examples.
| Mobile device throughput | Potential impact on primary function of WTP |
|---|---|
| 0.25 Mbps | Max throughput decreases from 50 Mbps to 35 Mbps |
| 0.5 Mbps | Max throughput decreases from 50 Mbps to 18 Mbps |
| 0.75 Mbps | Max throughput decreases from 50 Mbps to 1 Mbps |
Anyfi.net software takes both backhaul and spectrum use into account and recalculates bandwidth limits for mobile STAs many times per minute. The result is the best possible mobile user experience with no impact to the primary function of the WTP. The table below provides some examples of such calculated bandwidth limits.
| Local STA throughput | Mobile STA throughput limit |
|---|---|
| 0 Mbps | No throttling of mobile STA |
| 0.1 Mbps | Mobile STA throttled to 0.5 Mbps |
| 47 Mbps | Mobile STA throttled to 0.05 Mbps |
Handover from WTP to WTP is handled through the standard IEEE 802.11 mechanism, i.e. the mobile device periodically scans for new access points. It is however possible to restrict the mobile devices choice of WTP through the network visibility control mechanism. This leads to a hybrid between client controlled and infrastructure controlled handover.
The Anyfi.net architecture where mobile data is always tunneled through a tunnel termination back-end aligns perfectly with the standard IEEE 802.11 mobility mechanism. Layer 2 connectivity is preserved during handover and Layer 3 connections are therefore unaffected. Since the IEEE 802.1X authenticator runs in the tunnel termination back-end the implementation of key caching and fast handover is greatly facilitated.
When a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel is terminated in on broadband subscriber's premises data needs to traverse the subscriber's home broadband connection twice. The reason is that the cryptographic key needed to encrypt and decrypt IEEE 802.11 frames to and from a mobile device is only available in the back-end portion of the IEEE 802.11 stack in the subscribers own residential gateway or Wi-Fi router. This has strong benefits from a security point of view but may have some drawbacks from a traffic engineering perspective.
With most access network technologies this roundtrip to the subscriber's premises is all things considered acceptable, but there may be cases where the incentives to avoid the roundtrip are significant. For example, digital subscriber line technologies (xDSL) may constrain throughput in the uplink to less than 1 Mbps and since encrypted IEEE 802.11 frames destined for a mobile device will need to traverse the uplink this will limit the downstream throughput. Perhaps even more pressingly, in DOCSIS based access networks the total aggregate uplink capacity of a cable plant can be relatively low, and increasing this uplink capacity is already a major cost burden for operators.
This problem can however be solved by relaxing the security model in a careful and controlled manner. A novel network element, the Optimizer, is inserted in the communication path between the radio front-end and tunnel termination back-end. The Temporal Key (TK) used to encrypt and decrypt Unicast IEEE 802.11 data frames to and from the mobile device can then be transferred to the Optimizer and Internet-bound traffic can be broken out there.
This requires that the Optimizer and the key transfer mechanism can be considered trustworthy from the tunnel termination back-end's point of view. While this cannot be assumed in the general case there are some relevant special cases where this requirement can be met. Consider for instance the case where a DOCSIS operator has integrated Anyfi.net software (separately licensed under non-standard terms) in cable modems and is operating its own matchmaking service. The end-subscriber can be assumed to trust the operator since the residential gateway firmware is operator managed. It would therefore be acceptable for the tunnel termination back-end software in the residential gateway to transfer the Temporal Key (TK) to the operator controlled matchmaking service. The key can then be further transfered to the Optimizer which is also under the operators control.
The Optimizer is currently only available as part of a fully managed solution.
The Optimizer can also be used in a mobile Wi-Fi offload scenario to selectively terminate some of the mobile traffic in the fixed-line network edge while terminating other traffic in the mobile core. The Optimizer is then integrated in the fixed-line network edge while the tunnel termination back-end is implemented in a tunnel termination gateway installed in the mobile core.
Anyfi.net software consists of the radio front-end daemon anyfid and the tunnel termination back-end daemon myfid. On Linux platforms these are typically compiled to a multi-call binary to save Flash memory.
| anyfi/LICENSE | License file permitting integration and royalty-free redistribution |
|---|---|
| anyfi/anyfid | Anyfi.net radio front-end daemon |
| anyfi/anyfidctl | Control script for anyfid |
| anyfi/myfid | Anyfi.net tunnel termination back-end daemon |
| anyfi/myfidctl | Control script for myfid |
| anyfi/anyfimac | Anyfi.net software compiled into a Linux multi-call binary |
| broadcom/ | Integration package for Broadcom licensees |
| ralink/ | Integration package for Ralink licensees |
| atheros/ | Integration package for Atheros licensees |
This chapter details how to integrate this software in the firmware image of a public access point, residential gateway, consumer Wi-Fi router or tunnel termination gateway (TTG).
The radio front-end software consists of the user space daemon anyfid and its associated scripts.
In this section we detail the requirements and impact of this software on the target system and outline how to integrate the software in a firmware image.
In order to function as a radio front-end the Wi-Fi chipset must have a software defined IEEE 802.11 Media Access Control (MAC) layer and support for multiple BSSIDs. Modern chipsets from most vendors meet this requirement.
The Wi-Fi driver must also support a low level interface so that Anyfi.net software can monitor the radio environment to detect the presence of a mobile device as well as send and receive raw encrypted IEEE 802.11 frames. The modern Linux Wi-Fi driver architecture (mac80211) supports this interface out of the box while older proprietary drivers may require some modification as part of the integration process.
Driver modifications for chipsets from Broadcom Corporation, Ralink Technology Corporation and Qualcomm Atheros are available as part of our reference integrations.
The Anyfi.net radio front-end daemon is approximately 100 KB in size uncompressed. After compression (e.g. as part of a squashfs firmware image) it will consume approximately 40 KB of Flash memory. No data needs to be read or written to Flash during the operation of the system.
In its standard configuration the radio front-end daemon will use approximately 1 MB of RAM memory when idle and up to 2 MB at maximum throughput. Most of this memory is used for caching and throttling buffers. Memory use can be reduced substantially by reducing cache and buffer sizes if required.
The processing done by the radio front-end daemon anyfid is very lightweight but nonetheless consumes CPU cycles, mostly for examining, copying and forwarding IEEE 802.11 frames. When no mobile clients are connected through the local radio this utilization should be minimal (below 5%) on a modern embedded CPU. When a mobile client is transferring data this CPU utilization can increase to 20 – 40% depending on throughput and CPU performance. The CPU load is largely independent on the number of connected mobile devices or the number of remote Wi-Fi networks accessed.
The radio front-end portion of Anyfi.net software has only relatively trivial operating system dependencies: memory allocation, file access, signals, etc.
The front-end daemon anyfid should be installed alongside other system daemons and started once the primary BSS of the access point is operational. Run the daemon with the following command:
anyfid --accept-license -B monitor0 -P /var/run/anyfid.pidExample 3.1.5.1. Start anyfid in the background.
The -B flag specifies that the daemon should run in the background. The -P file instructs anyfid to create a file containing its process ID number (PID).
The --account command line option can be used to tie this radio to a platform Account.
To stop anyfid you send the TERM signal to its PID. On a Linux system that would be done with kill, e.g. as below.
kill –TERM $(cat /var/run/anyfid.pid)Example 3.1.5.2. Stop anyfid with the TERM signal.
The PID file will be removed by anyfid as part of its cleanup and exit.
Whenever the Wi-Fi settings are changed, e.g. when changing the channel number, anyfid must be restarted. Do this by stopping the daemon with the TERM signal and starting it again.
The tunnel termination back-end software consists of the user space daemon myfid and its associated scripts.
In this section we detail the requirements and impact of this software on the target system and outline how to integrate the software in a firmware image.
The Anyfi.net tunnel termination back-end daemon (myfid) is approximately 300 KB in size uncompressed. After compression (e.g. as part of a squashfs firmware image) it will consume approximately 150 KB of Flash memory. No data needs to be read or written to flash during the operation of the system.
The tunnel termination back-end portion of the software will use very little RAM, usually in the range of 10 KB per Wi-Fi over IP tunnel. A typical residential gateway will rarely terminate more than a handful of tunnels at any one time.
Frame processing on the tunnel termination back-end side requires significantly more CPU resources than on the front-end. The reason is that IEEE 802.11 frames are encrypted and decrypted in software on the back-end (since the hardware AES/RC4 implementation in the Wi-Fi chipset cannot easily be used to encrypt or decrypt a frame sent or received over IP). A modern CPU (e.g. 400 Mhz MIPS 24Kc) can perform AES encryption or decryption at a rate of about 10 Mbps. This often sets the upper limit for the throughput of a mobile device. The CPU load is largely independent of the number of separate Wi-Fi over IP tunnels being terminated and instead varies approximately linearly with aggregate throughput.
Anyfi.net software is implemented in ISO C and easily portable across a number of embedded operating systems. Operating system dependencies are for the most part relatively trivial: memory allocation, file access, sockets, signals and similar usually met by a subset of the POSIX API.
In addition to this the tunnel termination back-end software also depends on system software for Ethernet bridging. On Linux systems these dependencies are often resolved against the kernel tun/tap interface functionality. This requires that the Linux kernel be built with the following configuration flags:
The tunnel termination back-end daemon myfid (or the multi-call binary anyfimac) should be installed alongside other system daemons and started once the primary BSS of the access point is operational.
We assume below that the interface associated with the primary BSS is named "ap0" and that a monitor interface "monitor0" receives frames on the same radio.
myfid -B -i ap0 –m monitor0 br-lan /var/run/ap0.confExample 3.2.4.1. Start the myfid tunnel termination back-end daemon.
Like anyfid, myfid accepts the -P flag to specify a custom PID file path. Stop myfid by sending the TERM signal to its PID.
The -i command line argument specifies a Primary BSS that should be monitored for new devices connecting. When a new device is detected myfid will instruct the matchmaking server to create a Binding so that the device can connect to this network when mobile. We say that the client is auto-bound to the network. It is possible to remove all these bindings by passing the -r (or --reset) flag to myfid when it is started. We recommend that the integration does this whenever the passphrase is changed, or there is some other indication that previously connected devices should no-longer have access to the network.
The --account command line argument can optionally be used to tie this service to a platform Account.
kill –TERM $(cat /var/run/myfid.pid)Example 3.2.4.2. Stop myfid with the TERM signal.
It is advisable to restart the myfid daemon whenever the Wi-Fi settings are changed. Do this by stopping the daemon with the TERM signal and starting it again.
Public access point vendors only need to integrate the radio front-end software. The recommended configuration interface is a simple on/off checkbox determining if the radio front-end daemon anyfid should be started or not. The configuration interface should also allow a platform Account to be provided as a command line argument to anyfid.
Off-the-shelf integrations for reference designs from Broadcom Corporation, Ralink Technology Corporation and Qualcomm Atheros are available to authorized licensees. Integration on one of these platforms should take no more than a man-week. Anyfi Networks can provide professional integration services.
The Anyfi.net radio front-end software is available to all under a no-charge royalty-free license.
Most public access point systems have remote firmware update capability. It should be possible to flash a firmware image incorporating Anyfi.net software into existing public access points at zero CAPEX.
Residential gateway vendors should integrate both the radio front-end and the tunnel termination back-end software. The recommended configuration user interface is a simple on/off checkbox determining if the software should be started or not, and a boolean TR-069 variable to control the same. The web interface should not allow the end-subscriber to specify a platform Account but operator control of this through TR-069 or similar is recommended.
Some use-cases, most notably mobile Wi-Fi offload, only requires the radio front-end software to be operated. When this is the operator's only requirement it is possible to conserve Flash memory by integrating only front-end portion of the software. Another option is to integrate both the front-end and the back-end and use a tri-state TR-069 variable to control its operation: a) both front-end and back-end (with configuration user interface), b) only radio front-end (without a configuration user interface) and c) all Anyfi.net software disabled.
Off-the-shelf integrations for reference designs from Broadcom Corporation, Ralink Technology Corporation and Qualcomm Atheros are available to authorized licensees. Integration on one of these platforms should take no more than a man-week. Anyfi Networks can provide professional integration services.
Most residential gateway platforms support remote firmware updates and most operators have processes in place for this. It should be possible to flash a firmware image incorporating Anyfi.net software into existing residential gateways at zero CAPEX.
Consumer Wi-Fi router vendors should integrate both the radio front-end and the tunnel termination back-end software. The recommended configuration user interface is a simple on/off checkbox determining if the software should be started or not.
Optionally the configuration user interface may also allow the end-user to associate the local Radio and Service with an Account. We recommend that this configuration option only be made available to advanced users, if at all.
Off-the-shelf integrations for reference designs from Broadcom Corporation, Ralink Technology Corporation and Qualcomm Atheros are available to authorized licensees. Integration on one of these platforms should take no more than a man-week. Anyfi Networks can provide professional integration services.
A tunnel termination gateway, as the name implies, should only support tunnel termination back-end functionality functionality. The configuration interface needs to allow adjustment of the standard Wi-Fi network settings, e.g. SSID, security mechanism, encryption algorithms and RADIUS servers. The interface should also allow the operator to specify an Account that the resulting Service should be associated with.
Encryption and decryption of IEEE 802.11 frames can easily become a computational bottleneck on general purpose CPUs. AES-128 encryption hardware is therefore essential for high throughput applications. Anyfi.net software can leverage the Linux kernel APIs for hardware acceleration. These support e.g. Intel AES-NI instructions and the AMD Geode hardware crypto accelerator.
Anyfi.net software is available to all under a no-charge royalty-free license.
Anyfi Networks licenses high performance alternative implementations separately for use in tunnel termination gateways. Please contact info@anyfinetworks.com to discuss licensing options.
Anyfi.net software is fully functional out of the box. But to build a commercial carrier Wi-Fi service you will need to control the functioning of the software by interfacing with the platform through one of it's interfaces; the control panel or the RESTful XML API.
For access to these interfaces you need to select a plan and register an account. When you register you will be asked for an email address. This email address serves as an identifier and allows you to tie your front-ends and back-ends to your Account, by entering the same email address when configuring your equipment. How you do that depends on the type of equipment, e.g. a carrier Wi-Fi access point may allow you to configure the account both through a web configuration interface and through TR-069, whereas a residential gateway may only allow such configuration by the operator through TR-069. Once tied to your Account the front-ends and back-ends will show up in the platform as Radios and Services, allowing you to control their functioning to create your carrier Wi-Fi service.
In this chapter we go through how you can leverage the Anyfi.net carrier Wi-Fi platform to create and manage a commercial carrier Wi-Fi service. But before we go into the details of what the platform interfaces will let you control let's start with a brief discussion about what they will not. The fundamental contribution of Anyfi.net technology is to separate the physical radio from the logical Wi-Fi network. This essentially splits the Wi-Fi configuration space in two parts, the radio front-end configuration and the tunnel termination back-end configuration, but it also adds a new configuration space related to network visibility, or "who can see what?" The platform interfaces are focused on the last part, i.e. they allow you to control which Client can connect to which Service through which Radio. Basic Wi-Fi configuration, like SSID, channel, passphrase, etc. is configured separately outside the scope of this platform, e.g. through a web configuration interface or TR-069.
The following abstract concepts are used across platform interfaces.
An Account is a representation of a legal entity interacting with the platform. The Account is charged for use of the platform.
An Account is identified by the email address that was used to register the Account.
A Client is a representation of a mobile Wi-Fi device.
A Client is identified in the platform by its MAC address. Note however that the MAC address is not used for authentication purposes.
A Radio is a representation of an IEEE 802.11 access point radio partially controlled by Anyfi.net software. A residential gateway for instance often has a single Radio. A public access point with integrated Anyfi.net software may have several Radios. From a platform point of view these are entirely separate entities.
A Radio is identified by the permanent MAC address of the Wi-Fi chipset.
A Service is a representation of an Extended Service Set (ESS). This may be the home network associated with a residential gateway or the switching backplane of a tunnel termination gateway (TTG). Each Service has an ESSID, also known as an SSID, but this is not guaranteed to be globally unique. A Service is instead identified by a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID).
Bindings control network visibility, specifying that a certain Service should visible to a certain Client when that client device is close to a certain Radio. Bindings can be created and destroyed through the control panel or the RESTful web service, but they can also be created automatically when a Client is authenticated locally (and destroyed e.g. when the passphrase is changed).
Bindings always specify a unique Service, but may specify several Clients and Radios with a wildcard pattern. This makes Bindings a very powerful concept: essentially any type of mobile Wi-Fi service can be created by creating appropriate Bindings.
Below are a number of examples of Bindings filling various purposes.
| Service | Client | Radio | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0ac8117e-719c-11b3-01fc-42aabd4ea2 | 00:4a:71:55:9f:d4 | * | The Service with UUID 0ac8117e-719c-11b3-01fc-42aabd4ea2 should be visible to Client with MAC address 00:4a:71:55:9f:d4 when within range of any Radio. A Binding of this form is typically created by the auto-bind mechanism when a device authenticates with a Primary BSS associated with the Service. It can be used e.g. to provide seamless and secure remote access to a home Wi-Fi network. |
| 0bd072e0-7a78-11e1-b0c4-0800200c9a66 | * | 00:64:87:d4:f3:12 | The Service with UUID 0bd072e0-7a78-11e1-b0c4-0800200c9a66 should be visible to any Client that happens to be within range of the Radio with the permanent MAC address 00:64:87:d4:f3:12. A Binding of this form could e.g. be used to instruct a consumer Wi-Fi router to serve as a virtual Remote Access Point (vRAP) for a certain corporate WLAN. |
| 9cbc3920-7a7c-11e1-b0c4-0800200c9a66 | * | * | The Service with UUID 9cbc3920-7a7c-11e1-b0c4-0800200c9a66 should be visible to any Client that happens to be within range of any Radio associated with the Account. A Binding of this form could be used e.g. to instruct all of an operator's Wi-Fi equipped residential gateways to distribute a SIM-authenticated carrier-grade Wi-Fi network for mobile offload. |
Note that a Binding by default can only affect Radios and Services associated with the same Account.
In this context it should also be noted that Bindings are not a network access restriction mechanism. All connections are separately secured with the standard WPA/WPA2 security mechanism as configured in the tunnel termination back-end.
A Binding is identified by an integer assigned by the platform. This integer identifier is guaranteed to be unique within the scope of a single Account.
A Contract is a representation of a contractual agreement between a subscriber and an operator. From a technical perspective a Contract determines what happens after a Client connects to a Service. For example, the Contract can stipulate that the Capture mechanism should be employed to restrict access to the network and interact with the subscriber through a captive portal web application. The Contract is also the basis for all settlement through the radio access capacity exchange.
A Contract specifies a Service, a subscriber identity (EAP user or device MAC) and a type. The only currently supported type is "data". For "data" Contracts the associated Account is charged per byte transferred. More Contract types, e.g. day passes, week passes and monthly contracts with unlimited data may be supported in the future.
A Contract is identified by an integer assigned by the platform. This integer identifier is guaranteed to be unique within the scope of a single Account.
Accounting Records document the use of Radio resources to provide a Client access to a Service. From a technical perspective an Accounting Record contains information about a certain Client's use of a certain Radio to access a certain Service. Information collected includes data volume, connection time and radio link quality parameters.
An Accounting Record is identified by an integer assigned by the platform. This integer identifier is guaranteed to be unique within the scope of a single Account.
The tunnel termination back-end portion of Anyfi.net software implements a number of mechanisms that can be used as building blocks in advanced carrier Wi-Fi services. We here describe these in detail.
The auto-bind mechanism allows the tunnel termination back-end to automatically create a Binding under some circumstances. This automatic registration mechanism can be used to create mobile Wi-Fi services with a ZERO sign-on user experience. The tunnel termination back-end software may create Bindings under the following circumstances:
When the tunnel termination back-end software is integrated in equipment with a local IEEE 802.11 access point it can be instructed to monitor this access point to detect when a STA authenticates, and to auto-bind the corresponding Client to the corresponding Service.
The tunnel termination back-end software can also monitor a wired network port and detect IEEE 802.3 frames coming from a previously unknown device, and auto-bind the corresponding Client to the Service. This can be used in conjunction with legacy access points to automatically bind Clients when they have authenticated with a legacy access point connected to the same ESS.
Since a Binding can contain wildcard identifiers for the Client and Radio it may in some circumstances be beneficial to create a more specific binding the first time a Client connects remotely over a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel. The tunnel termination back-end software can be instructed to automatically create such bindings.
Note that the auto-bind mechanism may attempt to create the same Binding several times. This is however inconsequential since subsequent attempts will be filtered out and ignored in the cloud-based matchmaking service.
The Capture mechanism allows HTTP requests from the Client to be intercepted in the tunnel termination back-end and redirected to a specific URL, the Capture URL.
The Capture URL is of the format
http://#{PORTAL_HOST}/capture?service=#{SERVICE_UUID}&client=#{CLIENT_MAC}&radio=#{RADIO_MAC}
with variable parts defined below.
| PORTAL_HOST | The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) or IP address of the host running the portal web application. This is a configurable property of the Service. |
|---|---|
| SERVICE_UUID | The UUID of the Service to which the Client has connected. |
| CLIENT_MAC | The MAC address of the Client. |
| RADIO_MAC | The MAC address of the Radio through which the Client is currently accessing the Service. |
The Capture mechanism is only applied to a Client when the tunnel termination back-end is instructed to do so by the cloud-based matchmaking service. The matchmaking server examines the associated Contract and Service to determine this: if a capture URL has been configured in the Service and the Contract stipulates that the Client should be captured the tunnel termination back-end is instructed to apply the Capture mechanism.
It is also possible to configure a Service with a whitelist of IP ranges that should be accessible to the subscriber even when the Capture mechanism is active.
The Activate mechanism can be used to lift an access restriction already imposed by the Capture mechanism. When the captive portal web application has finished interacting with the end-user access restrictions can be lifted by directing the end-user's browser to a specific URL, the Activate URL.
The Activate URL is of the format
http://#{PORTAL_HOST}:3000/activate?token=#{ACCESS_TOKEN}&url=#{NEXT_URL}
with variable parts defined below.
| PORTAL_HOST | The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) or IP address of the host running the portal web application. If the portal web application is reachable at the URL 'http://the-portal-web-application.com/' then the PORTAL_HOST is 'the-portal-web-application.com'. |
|---|---|
| ACCESS_TOKEN | The access token received in an HTTPS response from the RESTful web service when creating an appropriate Binding (i.e. under which the Client in question can access the Service through the currently used Radio). |
| NEXT_URL | The URL to which the browser in the Client should be redirected after access restrictions have been lifted. |
Note that the Activate URL is not a real URL in the sense that the portal web application should respond to HTTP requests on port 3000. Instead this request is intercepted by the tunnel termination back-end and a HTTP redirect response is generated locally in the tunnel termination point (TTP), after the access token has been verified.
In the case of an error the browser in the Client is directed back to the portal web application with an 'error' parameter describing the error.
The Identify mechanism allows you to detect how a Client is currently connected even in cases when the end-user's browser has not been redirected to your website through the Capture mechanism. By redirecting the browser in the Client to a special URL, the Identify URL, you can identify the Client, Service and Radio of the current connection.
The Identify URL is of the format
http://#{PORTAL_HOST}:3000/identify?url=#{NEXT_URL}
with variable parts defined below.
| PORTAL_HOST | The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) or IP address of the host running the portal web application. If the portal web application is reachable at the URL 'http://the-portal-web-application.com/' then the PORTAL_HOST is 'the-portal-web-application.com'. |
|---|---|
| NEXT_URL | The URL to which the browser in the Client should be redirected after the Service, Client and Radio of the connection has been identified. For security reasons the host portion of this URL must be identical with PORTAL_HOST. |
Note that the Identify URL is not a real URL in the sense that the portal web application should respond to HTTP requests on port 3000. Instead this request is intercepted by the tunnel termination back-end and a HTTP redirect response is generated locally in the tunnel termination point (TTP).
The result will
be returned to you as HTTP GET parameters on a subsequent redirect back to your
web application. The request URL will have the format
#{NEXT_URL}?service=#{SERVICE_UUID}&client=#{CLIENT_MAC}&radio=#{RADIO_MAC}
with variable parts defined below.
| NEXT_URL | The URL passed in the 'url' parameter in the request to the Identify URL. |
|---|---|
| SERVICE_UUID | The UUID of the Service to which the Client is currently connected if any. If the Client is not currently connected through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel this parameter will not be included in the request. |
| CLIENT_MAC | The MAC address of the Client. |
| RADIO_MAC | The MAC address of the Radio through which the Client is currently connected. If the Client is not currently connected through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel this parameter will not be included in the request. |
This mechanism can be used to implement convenient management of mobile subscriptions e.g. in subscriber self-service pages.
The easiest way to interface with the platform is through the web based control panel interface. This will let you provide seamless remote access to a home or corporate Wi-Fi network, distribute a centrally terminated carrier-grade Wi-Fi network through all your access points and monitor use of your service.
The simplest way to use the platform is to provide remote access to an existing residential or corporate Wi-Fi network. Radios and Services of course have to be associated with your Account, but other than that you can pretty much lean back and relax: the auto-bind mechanism will automatically create the necessary Binding whenever a new device is connected locally.
If you wish to charge the end-user for the service it gets slightly more complicated. You will need to set the captive portal URL on each Service to point to your portal web application. This will cause the Capture mechanism to redirect HTTP requests from Clients that to now yet have a Contract to your web application, where you can collect payment or agree on payment in the future. Your web application will also need to interact with the platform through the RESTful XML API in order to create new Contracts and activate service after payment has been arranged, e.g. in the form of a surcharge on the subscriber's next monthly bill.
While it is technically possible for an advanced user to circumvent the Capture mechanism in network equipment that is under his or her physical control, doing so is against the license terms of Anyfi.net software. Circumvention can be easily detected from the cloud-based matchmaking service and Services with circumvented access restrictions may be disabled.
Another way to use the platform is to distribute a centrally terminated carrier-grade Wi-Fi network through all your Radios.
For this you will of course need to tie your Radios to your Account. But you will also need some Tunnel Termination Points (TTPs) for your carrier-grade Service. A Tunnel Termination Gateway (TTG) is a network element designed for that purpose, terminating millions of Wi-Fi over IP tunnels in a data center or a mobile network core.
But since your subscribers will never connect locally to your TTG (it has no local Wi-Fi network — it exists only within the platform) you will need to manually create a Binding before this network becomes visible to any device. When a WPA/WPA2 Enterprise authenticated Service without local Radios is associated with your Account you will see a notice at the top of the page asking if you want to create a broadcast Binding for it. A broadcast binding makes your Service visible to all Clients within radio range of any one of your Radios. Just press the button to create the binding.
Now whenever a device comes close to any one of your access points they will be presented with your centrally terminated carrier-grade Wi-Fi network.
The control panel interface also lets you monitor use of your carrier Wi-Fi service. For a given time period it's possible to determine how many Clients have connected through a given Radio or to a certain Service, as well as data volume, connection time and radio link quality statistics.
This information is available through the RESTful XML API in the form of Accounting Record resources, allowing for integration with your favourite CRM system.
When the control panel interface does not offer sufficient control or flexibility the platform can instead be accessed more directly through this RESTful XML API. This API will also allow you to create your own web application that can interact with your users through the Capture mechanism.
API clients are authenticated using SSL client certificates. The client certificate ties the caller to an Account and determines which resources they can access and manipulate.
To retrieve a client certificate you need to first generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). Make sure that the Common Name (CN) is the email address that identifies your Account and that other fields are reasonably and truthfully filled in. Please do not specify an email address in any other field, or set a challenge passphrase.
openssl req -out anyfi-$(date +"%Y%m%d").csr \
-new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout anyfi.key
Example 4.4.1.1. Generate a Certificate Signing Request using OpenSSL.
Then upload the CSR through the control panel interface. We will review your request and if appropriate sign a corresponding certificate. When your certificate ("client.crt") has been signed it will be available for download.
You now have all the credentials you will need to authenticate. Please make sure that no third party learns your private key. If you believe that your private key has been compromised contact support@anyfi.net immediately.
alias scurl="curl --cert client.crt \
--key anyfi.key \
-H 'Accept: application/xml+vnd.anyfi.api-v1'"
Example 4.4.1.2. Define a bourne shell alias for curl using an SSL client certificate for authentication.
Errors are indicated with HTTP status codes and explained with accompanying plain text.
A radio resource is created by the platform every time a new Radio starts up and registers with the cloud-based matchmaking service. In order for the resource to be accessible through the RESTful XML API it must however have been associated with the API client's Account. This association is controlled with the --account command line option provided to anyfid. This command line option can often be controlled through the configuration interface of the access point.
Radio resources can be retrieved and manipulated as exemplified below.
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/radios.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <radios type="array"> <radio account="info@anyfinetworks.com" ip="193.13.███.███" hwaddr="00:25:86:d9:63:9e"/> <radio account="info@anyfinetworks.com" ip="193.13.███.███" hwaddr="00:27:22:aa:7d:e2"/> </radios>Example 4.4.3.1. Retrieve a list of radio resources.
A service resource is created by the platform whenever a new Service starts up and registers with the cloud-based matchmaking service.
In order for the resource to be accessible through the RESTful XML API it must however have been associated with the API client's Account. This association is controlled with the --account command line option provided to myfid. This command line option can often be controlled through the configuration interface of the access point or tunnel termination gateway.
Service resources can be retrieved and manipulated as exemplified below.
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/services.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<services type="array">
<service account="info@anyfinetworks.com"
capture_url=""
uuid="5e5d0125-15b6-4907-9d91-49613689a913"
ssid="Kontoret"
authentication="personal">
<instance ip="193.13.███.███" load_factor="0.079"/>
</service>
<service account="info@anyfinetworks.com"
capture_url=""
uuid="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
ssid="eapsim1x"
authentication="enterprise">
<instance ip="193.13.███.███" load_factor="0.0"/>
</service>
</services>
Example 4.4.4.1. Retrieve a list of service resources.
$ scurl -X PUT \
-H 'Content-Type: application/xml+vnd.anyfi.api-v1' \
-d '<service capture_url="http://some.web.application/capture"></service>' \
https://anyfi.net/api/services/5e5d0125-15b6-4907-9d91-49613689a913.xml
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/services/5e5d0125-15b6-4907-9d91-49613689a913.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service account="info@anyfinetworks.com"
capture_url="http://some.web.application/capture"
uuid="5e5d0125-15b6-4907-9d91-49613689a913"
authentication="personal"
ssid="Kontoret">
<instance load_factor="0.172" ip="193.13.███.███"/>
</service>
Example 4.4.4.2. Update the capture url of a service resource.
A contract resource is a representation of a Contract. Contracts are automatically created when a Client connects to a Service for the first time. A Contract can be manipulated or replaced by an administrator through the control panel interface or programmatically through this API.
Contract resources can be retrieved and manipulated as exemplified below.
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/contracts.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<contracts type="array">
<contract id="1918"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="c8:33:4b:47:c0:53" />
</contracts>
Example 4.4.5.1. Retrieve a list of contract resources.
$ scurl -X POST \
-d '<contract service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="c8:33:4b:47:c0:53"
max_bandwidth_up="1048576"
max_bandwidth_down="1048576" />'
https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/contracts/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<contract id="31"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="c8:33:4b:47:c0:53"
max_bandwidth_up="1048576"
max_bandwidth_down="1048576" />
Example 4.4.5.2. Replace a contract resource (there is no update).
A binding resource is a representation of a Binding. They can be created by the platform through the auto-bind mechanism, by an administrator through the control panel interface or programmatically through this API.
Binding resources can be retrieved and manipulated as exemplified below.
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/bindings.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<bindings type="array">
<binding id="12346"
radio="*"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="c8:33:4b:47:c0:53" />
<binding id="2147483663"
radio="*"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="*" />
</bindings>
Example 4.4.6.1. Retrieve a list of binding resources.
$ scurl -X DELETE \
https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/bindings/2147483663.xml
$ scurl https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/bindings.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<bindings type="array">
<binding id="12346"
radio="*"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="c8:33:4b:47:c0:53" />
</bindings>
Example 4.4.6.2. Delete a binding.
$ scurl -X POST \
-H 'Content-Type: application/xml+vnd.anyfi.api-v1' \
-d '<binding radio="*" service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7" client="*" />' \
https://anyfi.net/api/services/4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7/bindings/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<binding id="2147483663"
radio="*"
service="4ae9582b-0581-4ef7-b675-b3cbce03b6a7"
client="*" />
Example 4.4.6.3. Create a new binding (in this case a broadcast binding).
An accounting record resource is a representation of a Accounting Record. They are created automatically by the platform as Clients connect to Services. They can be retrieved through this API to monitor usage, create statistics and for other similar purposes.
$ scurl "https://anyfi.net/api/accounting_records.xml?from=2012-06-01&to=2012-06-02"
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<accounting_records type="array">
<accounting_record id="67721"
buyer="info@anyfinetworks.com"
seller="█████@█████.com"
radio="00:27:22:aa:7d:e2"
contract="8171"
created_at="2012-06-01 08:36:57 UTC"
data_up="9.22 MB"
data_down="14.13 MB"
amount="0.01 USD"/>
</accounting_records>
Example 4.4.7.1. Retrieve a list of accounting record resources for a specific period.
Anyfi.net technology enables many new opportunities. We here go through a few examples, and detail the process of integrating the software and interfacing with the platform.
In this example we show how a fixed-line broadband operator can leverage Anyfi.net technology to extend the home Wi-Fi user experience outside the home. Mobile devices connect to the subscriber's own home gateway through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel and are automatically authenticated using the standard WPA/WPA2 Personal authentication mechanism.
While it is of course possible to mount public access points with Anyfi.net software we here concentrate on the case where the operator can provide coverage by leveraging their own installed base of Wi-Fi equipped residential gateways.
Before we go into the mobile user experience we should point out that our first priority is always to protect the primary function of the residential gateway, i.e the fixed-line subscriber's use of the connection. The Anyfi.net radio front-end software carefully monitors the fixed-line subscriber's use of both backhaul and radio resources. When there is a risk that a mobile user may in any way impact the primary function the mobile user will be throttled, both in the downstream and upstream direction, to prevent such impact. We call this spectrum aware traffic prioritization.
The home Wi-Fi user experience should be familiar to most. Anyfi.net technology lets an operator provide that exact same user experience outside the home, whenever the subscriber is close to any one of the operator's residential gateways. The user experience is exactly like at home; open a laptop or take the key lock off a phone and it will automatically connect. Note that there is no software to install on the device, no manual registration process and no username or password to remember. Yet the connection is completely secure, protected end-to-end with the standard WPA/WPA2 Personal security mechanism.
The quality of experience is however highly dependent on the radio access coverage, which in turn depends on the operator's geographic market penetration. An operator with a residential broadband market share of 5-10% should be able to provide acceptable service with reasonable coverage in an inner city area. In areas with a lower density of residential broadband connections the service will be of a more nomadic nature than fully mobile.
Anyfi.net software is available under a no-charge royalty-free license and can be deployed in residential gateways as a remote firmware update. This however requires that the operator has a remote firmware update process in place.
While Anyfi.net software an be integrated on most residential gateway platforms integration is greatly simplified if the platform is Linux based and uses a Broadcom, Ralink or Atheros Wi-Fi chipset.
In addition the operator may need a provisioning system (based e.g. on TR-069) in order to enable and disable Anyfi.net software for individual subscribers.
The key strengths of Anyfi.net technology translate into a superior user experience, as well as a scalable and economical solution for the operator.
| No client-side software | The subscriber does not need to install any additional software on their device, or anywhere else. |
|---|---|
| No manual registration | Devices are automatically registered for the mobile service when they are first connected to the home Wi-Fi network. This process is completely invisible to the end-subscriber. |
| No touch authentication | The passphrase already stored in the device will be reused for authentication. As soon as a device comes within radio range of any residential gateway it will automatically authenticate with the subscriber's own residential gateway, though a "Wi-Fi over IP" tunnel, using the standard WPA/WPA2 4-way handshake. The process is completely transparent to the end-subscriber. |
| Advanced traffic prioritization | Mobile users are automatically throttled to ensure that the user experience of the local subscriber is not in any way impacted. Both backhaul bandwidth and spectrum use are taken into account. |
| Strong mutual authentication | The device is of course authenticated to the network, but the network is also authenticated to the device. The subscriber can be sure that they are in fact connected to their own home Wi-Fi network (through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel) and not to a rogue access point. |
| End-to-end encryption | The Wi-Fi encryption protects the communication end-to-end, all the way from the device to the subscriber's own residential gateway. Even if an attacker is in physical control of the local access point (which is usually another subscriber's residential gateway) they cannot eavesdrop on or modify the communication. |
| Full mobility | Since Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are always terminated at the same place devices stay connected to the same Layer 2 network when roaming from one visited gateway to another. This means that handovers are completely seamless and that traffic traceability and other regulatory requirements are met. |
| Infinite scalability | The Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are peer-to-peer and neither data nor signaling traffic passes through any central location. In effect you are leveraging an immense distributed system to handle tunnel termination and authentication; all the CPUs in your entire installed base of residential gateways. |
In this deployment scenario both the radio front-end and the tunnel termination back-end portions of Anyfi.net software needs to be integrated in residential gateways.
A three stage deployment process is recommended:
Anyfi.net software integrated in a (beta) firmware image targeting the relevant customer premises equipment such as residential gateways or modems with integrated Wi-Fi. This firmware image is then tested in the operator's lab. A successful outcome of the lab trial may be a suitable first tollgate for the integration project.
The equipment vendor delivers a production firmware image to the operator and this image is used to remotely update a large installed base of customer premises equipment. At this stage only the front-end portion of the software should be activated in order to ensure that the user experience of subscribers is not yet impacted, and that the operator is not charged for all subscribers during the field trial. Depending on the business model that the operator wishes to implement it may or may not be necessary to integrate with OSS/BSS systems. The back-end portion of the software can then be activated for select subscribers, e.g. the employees of the operator or a small set of beta subscribers.
In some cases it may be necessary to optimize data flow from a traffic engieering perspective at this stage. A successful outcome of the field trial may be a suitable second tollgate for the integration project.
Once the field trial has been successfully concluded the mobile Wi-Fi service can be enabled for all subscribers by simply activating the back-end portion of the software in all residential gateways.
In this example we show how a fixed-line operator can leverage Anyfi.net technology to securely offload mobile data onto Wi-Fi with authentication directly against the SIM card. Since the standard WPA/WPA2 Enterprise security mechanism protects the communication end-to-end, over both air and wire, existing Wi-Fi assets such as residential gateways and third party access points can be securely leveraged, even if their physical security cannot be guaranteed.
While it is of course possible to mount public access points with Anyfi.net software we here concentrate on the case where the operator can provide coverage by leveraging their own installed base of Wi-Fi equipped residential gateways.
Before we go into the mobile user experience we should point out that our first priority is always to protect the primary function of the residential gateway, i.e. the fixed-line subscriber's use of the connection. The Anyfi.net radio front-end software in the residential gateway carefully monitors the fixed-line subscriber's use of both backhaul and radio resources. When there is a risk that a mobile subscriber may in any way impact the primary function the mobile subscriber will be throttled, both in the downstream and upstream direction, to prevent such impact. We call this spectrum aware traffic prioritization.
SIM authentication with EAP-SIM/AKA has been a part of the Wi-Fi standard for some time, and with recent initiatives by the Wi-Fi Alliance [7] and the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) [8] device support is set to accelerate. On most devices, e.g. all Apple devices, a ZERO sign-on user experience can be achieved.
Anyfi.net technology adds to this user experience in important ways. Firstly, the Wi-Fi over IP tunnel ensures that the mobile communication is protected by the WPA/WPA2 security mechanism end-to-end, all the way from the device to the operator's data center or core network. Secondly, since the IEEE 802.1X authentication is performed in a tunnel termination gateway (TTG) and the encryption keys never leave this gateway the strong mutual authentication property of the WPA/WPA2 security mechanism is preserved. This means that the end-subscriber can be certain that they are in fact connected to their trusted mobile operator, and not to a rogue access point (with unauthorized access to the operator's RADIUS interface). Lastly but perhaps most importantly, Anyfi.net technology allows the operator to only offload mobile devices to Wi-Fi when the radio link between device and access point meets some minimum quality requirement and to fail gracefully when tunnel termination or IEEE 802.1X authentication resources become a limiting factor.
The operator can also manage the quality of experience dynamically through the RESTful web service, e.g. ensuring that only the devices with a high data volume usage pattern or a certain type of data plan are presented with the operator branded and EAP-SIM/AKA authenticated Wi-Fi network.
Anyfi.net software is available under a no-charge royalty-free license and can be deployed in residential gateways as a remote firmware update. This however requires that the operator has a remote firmware update process in place.
While Anyfi.net software can be integrated on most residential gateway platforms integration is greatly simplified if the platform is Linux based and uses a Broadcom, Ralink or Atheros Wi-Fi chipset.
In addition the operator may need a provisioning system (based e.g. on TR-069) in order to enable and disable Anyfi.net software for individual subscribers.
The key strengths of Anyfi.net technology translate into a superior user experience, as well as a scalable and economical solution for the operator.
| No client-side software | The subscriber does not need to install any additional software on their device. |
|---|---|
| No manual registration | The subscriber does not need to register devices through a website or similar. Devices can either be pre-registered by the operator using the RESTful web service or automatically registered when they connect to a pre-existing public hotspot. |
| No touch authentication | Mobile devices can be authenticated directly against the SIM card using EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA. Alternatively the operator can pre-install a digital certificate in the mobile device and use e.g. EAP-TLS for authentication. The subscriber should not have to take any manual action, not even the first time the device connects to the network. |
| Advanced traffic prioritization | Mobile users are automatically throttled to ensure that fixed-line broadband subscribers' user experience is not in any way impacted. Both backhaul bandwidth and spectrum use are taken into account and only spare capacity is used for mobile offload. |
| Strong mutual authentication | The device is of course authenticated to the network, but the network is also authenticated to the device. And since the IEEE 802.1X authenticator runs not in the physically insecure local access point but in the tunnel termination gateway the AAA server is never exposed to the outside world. The subscriber can be sure that they are in fact connected to their trusted mobile network operator. |
| End-to-end encryption | The IEEE 802.11i encryption protects the data plane end-to-end, all the way from the mobile device to the tunnel termination gateway (TTG). Data integrity and confidentiality is ensured in the transport layer and even physically insecure access points such as residential gateways can be integrated into the mobile core as a "trusted non-3GPP access" (3GPP TS 33.402). The subscriber will notice a seamless user experience on more devices (since no I-WLAN or similar client software is necessary) and improved battery life (since encryption and decryption on the mobile device is done in dedicated hardware as part of the Wi-Fi chipset). |
| Full mobility with fast handover | Since Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are always terminated at the same place devices stay connected to the same Layer 2 network when roaming from one visited gateway to another. This means that handovers are completely seamless and that traffic traceability and other regulatory requirements are met. It also means that encryption keys derived using EAP-SIM or AKA can be cached in one secure place and reused, ensuring fast handover and reduced load on the operator's authentication infrastructure. |
| Infinite scalability | Access points do not connect to the tunnel termination gateway (TTG) until a mobile device is ready to use the service. The architecture therefore scales with the number of mobile devices, and not with the number of access points. Load balancing between tunnel termination gateways ensures scalability up to hundreds of millions of mobile devices and the RESTful web service can be leveraged to select for offload only those devices that will benefit the most. |
In this deployment scenario only the radio front-end portion of Anyfi.net software needs to be integrated in residential gateways. The tunnel termination back-end software comes pre-integrated in a tunnel termination gateway installed in the operator's data center or core network.
Public access points with IEEE 802.1X authentication support can be integrated in the system without requiring firmware integration of Anyfi.net software. Additional public access points with Anyfi.net software pre-integrated can easily be added to the system later to improve coverage in public areas with a high subscriber density.
A three stage deployment process is recommended:
Anyfi.net software is integrated in a (beta) firmware image targeting the relevant customer premises equipment such as residential gateways or modems with integrated Wi-Fi. This firmware image is then tested against a tunnel termination gateway (TTG) in the operator's lab. A successful outcome of the lab trial may be a suitable first tollgate for the integration project.
The equipment vendor delivers a production firmware image to the operator and this image is used to remotely update a large installed base of customer premises equipment. At this stage the service should not be accessible to all mobile devices. Individual devices should instead be bound to the service in the tunnel termination gateway with a Binding created using the control planel. The complete solution can then be tested in the field without causing any interruption.
Once the field trial has been successfully concluded mobile Wi-Fi offloading can be enabled for more devices by registering them individually through the RESTful web service, or by creating a wildcard Binding specifying all Clients.
Many consumer Wi-Fi routers and most corporate WLAN systems come with a guest access solution, usually implemented as an insecure open network with a separate SSID. Anyfi.net technology makes it possible to also provide guests with remote access to their own secure Wi-Fi networks, through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel.
In a corporate environment this functionality can be used e.g. to provide employees access to their own home Wi-Fi, easing the load on IT support for providing Internet access when employees bring their own devices into the workplace. When combined with the platform it can also be used to offload mobile data onto a corporate WLAN, using only the spare radio spectrum and backhaul.
In a residential setting the technology can be used to provide employees with remote access to the corporate WLAN network. A consumer Wi-Fi router can easily be configured to connect to a tunnel termination gateway installed in a corporate data center by simply associating them with the same Account. The result is a virtual Remote Access Point (vRAP), providing seamless and secure access to the corporate WLAN from the home.
An operator with Anyfi.net software integrated in residential gateways could provide the same virtual Remote Access Point (vRAP) functionality as a service.
Before we go into the guests user experience we should point out that our first priority is always to protect the primary function of the access point. The Anyfi.net radio front-end software carefully monitors primary use of both backhaul and radio resources. When there is a risk that a guest user may in any way impact the primary function that user will be throttled, both in the downstream and upstream direction, to prevent such impact. We call this spectrum aware traffic prioritization.
The user experience of remote access to a Wi-Fi network through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel is identical to that of local access to the same. There is no software to install on the device, no registration process and no new username or password to remember. Anyfi.net technology simply makes the preferred network of each and every device magically appear, where and when it's needed.
Anyfi.net software is available under a no-charge royalty-free license and can be integrated in most consumer Wi-Fi routers and corporate WLAN access points with 200 KB flash to spare. Integration is however greatly simplified if the target platform is Linux based and uses a Broadcom, Ralink or Atheros Wi-Fi chipset.
The key strengths of Anyfi.net technology translate into a superior user experience for your customers.
| No client-side software | There is no need to install any additional software on end-user devices. The solution works with any Wi-Fi device out of the box. |
|---|---|
| No manual registration | Our software registers devices for remote access when they connect to the regular home Wi-Fi or corporate WLAN network. This process is completely transparent to the end-user and no additional registration is necessary. |
| No touch authentication | The authentication credentials (WPA-PSK passphrase, TLS certificate or similar) already stored in the device will be reused for remote authentication. As soon as a device comes within radio range of any Anyfi.net enabled access point it will automatically authenticate with the remote network, though a "Wi-Fi over IP" tunnel, using the standard WPA or WPA2 4-way handshake. The process is completely transparent to the end-user. |
| Advanced traffic prioritization | Guests are automatically throttled to ensure that the user experience of local users is not impacted. Both backhaul bandwidth and spectrum use are taken into account. |
| Strong mutual authentication | The device is of course authenticated to the network, but the network is also authenticated to the device. A guest user can be sure that they are in fact remotely connected to their own Wi-Fi network (through a Wi-Fi over IP tunnel) and not to a rogue access point. |
| End-to-end encryption | The IEEE 802.11i encryption protects the communication end-to-end, all the way from the device to the guests own remote Wi-Fi network. Not even the administrator of the visited network can eavesdrop on or modify the communication. Also, since the encryption keys are only available in the guest's device and the remote tunnel termination back-end there is no way that an administrator can accidentally grant the guest access any of the host's local area network resources through a configuration error or similar. |
| Full mobility | Since Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are always terminated at the same place devices stay connected to the same Layer 2 network when roaming from WTP to WTP. This means that handovers are completely seamless and that traffic traceability as well as other regulatory requirements are met, even if the visited access points are owned and operated by separate entities. |
| Infinite scalability | The Wi-Fi over IP tunnels are peer-to-peer and neither data nor signaling traffic passes through any central location. In effect you are leveraging an immense distributed system to handle tunnel termination and authentication; all the CPUs in your entire installed base of Wi-Fi network equipment. |
For a consumer Wi-Fi router manufacturer integration is very straightforward: simply integrate the software in your firmware build environment. Anyfi Networks can assist with professional services and reference integrations for all the major platforms from Broadcom, Ralink and Atheros.
For a corporate WLAN vendor integration can be slightly more complex. This is because integration towards the platform may be necessary. If you have a continuing relationship with your customer base this should however pose no serious problem. You can integrate through the RESTful web service and resell our services on a wholesale basis. Alternatively you can leave the choice to your customer, allowing them to configure their equipment with an Anyfi.net Account if they so wish.
In some cases it may not be practical for a corporation to upgrade to access points and/or WLAN controllers with Anyfi.net support. In that case virtual Remote Access Point (vRAP) functionality can instead be implemented with a separate tunnel termination gateway (TTG). For small businesses a TTG implemented as a VMware image may suffice. This means that a virtual Remote Access Point (vRAP) solution can be bundled e.g. with a number of consumer Wi-Fi routers and quickly brought to market at a competitive price point.